Will unit-pricing reduce domestic waste? Lessons from a contingent valuation study by Tait, Peter R. et al.
Will Unit-Pricing Reduce Domestic Waste? Lessons from a Contingent 
Valuation Study. 
 
Peter R. Tait1 
Lana Friesen2 
Ross Cullen3 
 
Abstract: 
This paper estimates the effect of introducing unit-pricing for municipal domestic waste 
collection and disposal in Christchurch. The price effect is shown in a demand model 
estimation using data collected in a contingent valuation survey of Christchurch households 
conducted in 2003. The results show a small but significant price effect. Households on 
higher incomes exhibit a larger price effect than do those on low incomes. Private service is 
indicated as the most preferred option for substituting away from municipal service, followed 
closely by composting, compaction, and recycling.  The number of households participating 
in substitute activities that divert waste from landfill is shown to increase. 
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1. Introduction 
Collection and disposal of residential solid waste has traditionally been funded by flat 
fee systems or general tax revenue.  Because households face a zero marginal cost for waste, 
an inefficiently high amount of waste is generated and disposed of.  Unit-pricing, where 
households are charged per unit of waste, is one economic tool that can create an incentive 
for households to reduce waste.  This paper uses the contingent valuation methodology 
(CVM) to estimate the effect of introducing unit-pricing for domestic waste collection and 
disposal in Christchurch, New Zealand. 
Theoretical effects of unit pricing are well established in the literature (Wertz 1976; 
Morris and Holthausen, 1994; Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995; Choe and Fraser, 1999).  
Charging per unit of waste creates an incentive for households to reduce the amount of waste 
disposed of at the kerbside.  The incentive works at two levels.  First, households are 
encouraged to practise source reduction by purchasing goods that have relatively low waste 
management costs.  Secondly, households will make greater use of diversion options such as 
recycling and composting.  These diversion options typically have a zero direct monetary 
cost, but incur time and inconvenience costs.  The introduction of unit pricing lowers the 
relative cost of these options.  On the other hand, unit pricing can also lead to undesirable 
diversion such as illegal dumping and burning.  When the social costs of illegal disposal are 
high, unit pricing may no longer be socially beneficial (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1996). 
To achieve economic efficiency, the unit price should be set equal to marginal cost of 
collection and disposal.  Because disposal costs are weight-related, the ideal unit-pricing 
system would be weight-based.  However, administering a weight-based unit price system is 
costly, and most communities have adopted volume-based systems using either bags or cans.  
Bags are generally thought to create a greater incentive for waste reduction, because the 
minimum amount held is less than for a can. 
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In recent years many communities around the world have adopted unit pricing.  
However, most evidence comes from the USA where over 4,000 communities now use unit 
pricing programs for domestic waste service pricing, which serve over 27 million U.S. 
residents (Gordon, 1999).  An exception is Hong (1999) who studies the impact of unit 
pricing in South Korea.  Data is usually collected before and after the implementation of a 
unit pricing scheme.  The empirical evidence is mixed.  While there is general agreement that 
unit pricing reduces the amount of mixed waste collected at the kerbside, there is debate 
about both the magnitude of this impact, and the diversion options used. 
Community-level analysis typically shows a significant reduction in the amount of 
waste being sent to the landfill following introduction of unit pricing.  For example, Miranda 
et. al. (1994) find a range from 10% to 74%, with an average reduction across 21 
communities of 40%.  However, analysis using household level data has been more 
equivocal.  While van Houtven (1999) found that mixed waste collected at the kerbside fell 
by 50% following the introduction of a bag programme, most other studies report much 
smaller reductions (Nestor and Podolsky, 1998; Hong, 1999), with Hong even reporting that 
increases in the unit price had no significant impact on waste.  Fullerton & Kinnaman (1996) 
suggest that even these relatively low elasticities could be overstated if the reductions are 
based on volume rather than weight of waste.  They found that unit pricing leads to 
significant levels of compaction, with a 43% increase in bag weight.  As a result, while unit 
pricing was successful in significantly reducing the volume of waste, there was virtually no 
change in the weight. 
The evidence on use of diversion options is also mixed.  Most studies report that unit 
pricing causes an increase in both the rate of recycling and the level of participation (Miranda 
et al., 1994; Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1996; Hong et al., 1993; Hong, 1999).  However a 
recent United States study by Jenkins (2003) found that the level of unit-price had little if any 
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effect on recycling participation, highlighting that the outcome of unit-pricing programmes 
can not be taken as given. Illegal disposal is a significant problem for a small number of 
communities (Miranda et al., 1994).  Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) found that 28% of the 
reduction in waste was accounted for by undesirable diversion.  Community characteristics 
were found by Miranda (2002) to be important predictors of which communities experienced 
increases in undesirable diversion following implementation of unit pricing. Several studies 
found that the total amount of waste generated may actually increase following the 
introduction of unit pricing (Nestor and Podolsky, 1998; Hong, 1999).  This occurs when the 
increase in recycling outweighs any reduction in mixed waste, which could occur if 
households substitute towards bulky products that can more easily be recycled. 
The diversity of these experiences makes it difficult to apply these results to other 
communities, especially those located in another country.  Local characteristics, especially 
environmental attitudes (Gamba and Oskamp, 1994; Sterner and Bartelings, 1999), will 
significantly impact the diversion options chosen and ultimately impact on the success of any 
unit pricing programme. In New Zealand several municipalities use unit-pricing, however 
there is insufficient data for a detailed analysis.  The Wellington City Council has used a pay-
per-bag system for around seven years, making it one of New Zealand’s longest running 
programmes. They found that little illegal dumping resulted from the shift to a user pays 
system.  Similarly, the North Shore City Council reports that illegal dumping has remained at 
a background level and that the contamination of recycling bins with non-recyclable 
materials remains low at around 2%. Domestic waste diversion in North Shore amounts to 
around 35-40% (Moore, 2002).  The Waitakere City Council estimates that waste going to 
landfill has declined 28% since the implementation of unit-pricing (Moore, 2002).    
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These results provide little specific guidance for a community, like Christchurch, seeking 
to implement a unit pricing scheme.  No indication is given of how the unit-price should be 
chosen.  Existing empirical analyses typically use either a dummy variable for the presence of 
unit pricing or the average unit price for the area.  To overcome these problems we use the 
CVM, which allows us to collect exactly the type of data we need.  Responses are collected 
for several different unit prices.  In addition, the survey is tailored to focus on equity issues, 
as the Christchurch City Council (CCC) is particularly concerned with any regressive impacts 
of such a policy.  This research attempts to incorporate attitudes into the demand model by 
asking respondents to indicate their level of agreement with several statements indicating 
various attitudes motivating households to minimise waste. Because the respondents are 
dealing with a familiar good, some common CVM biases will be reduced. The study shows 
how CVM can aid in the design of a unit pricing scheme prior to implementation.   While 
applications of CVM in relation to domestic waste service are found in developing countries 
(Altaf and Hughes, 1994; Altaf and Deshazo, 1996; Anaman and Rashidah, 2000), 
researchers are usually seeking estimates of households’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for 
improvements in service quality, rather than reactions to price changes.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  The Christchurch waste problem is 
described in Section 2.  In Section 3, the survey and data collected are described.  The 
method used to estimate a demand function for kerbside waste is discussed in Section 4, 
while the results are in Section 5.  Conclusions and policy implications are summarized in 
Section 6. 
 
2. Background 
Christchurch is a city of approximately 320,000 residents.  During 2003, the average 
resident disposed of 111 kilograms of household waste via kerbside collection.  This waste 
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ends up in the city’s only landfill at Burwood.  The Christchurch City Council (CCC) 
provides weekly kerbside collection to all households.  The service is funded by a flat rate 
levied on households as part of general annual rates.  In order to be collected, waste must be 
placed in an official council “black bag” that has a 50 litre, 15 kilogram capacity.  Until 
recently each rateable property was supplied with 52 bags per year. This number has now 
been halved.  Residents can buy as many additional bags as they require for $1 a bag.  
Hazardous waste and liquids are prohibited but anything else can be put in the bag.  
Approximately 18% of households subscribe to a private waste collection service. 
As early as 1995 the CCC City Plan recognised the need for ‘sustainable 
development’ in the city (CCC, 1995). In 2002 the CCC adopted the New Zealand Waste 
Strategy 2002 as the basis for its own waste management plan.  The overarching goal is 
“towards zero waste and a sustainable New Zealand” (CCC, 2005). As part of achieving this 
goal, the CCC has adopted a target of an 80% reduction below 1994 levels, in kerbside waste 
collected by the Council by 2010.  Figure 1 shows trends for council collected domestic 
waste and recycling, and green waste at transfer stations over the past 20 years.   
While kerbside recycling has proved popular, with around 85% of households 
recycling each week, and the average resident recycling 66 kilograms of waste per year, the 
amount of black bag waste per person has remained virtually unchanged, showing only a 
slight downward trend in recent years.  Separation of green waste at the landfill to be 
composted has also not reduced kerbside collection, however most green waste would have 
been taken directly to the landfill rather than placed in a black bag. If this trend continues, the 
council target will not be achieved.  However research shows that much of what is thrown out 
in black bags has the potential to be diverted if households are given an incentive to do so.  
Kitchen and garden waste make up nearly half of an average bag (CCC, 2005), even though 
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Christchurch City Council estimates that approximately 60% of households compost at home 
or take green waste to transfer stations. 
The current flat rate funding however gives households little incentive to reduce 
waste below their annual allotment of bags.  One of the principles in the CCC waste strategy 
is that of “waster pays”.  The recent move to halve the number of bags is a step toward 
implementing unit pricing for kerbside refuse collection.  However households still face a 
zero marginal cost for the first 26 bags and a relatively low price of only $1 bag for 
additional bags.  Locally there has been opposition to even the halving of the number of bags, 
with concerns about the potentially regressive nature of the policy. 
 
3.  Data Description  
To collect the required information a self-administered questionnaire was sent to 1500 
Christchurch households in February and March of 2003. A proportionate-stratified random 
sample using the electoral roll was conducted, the design variable being household income. 
This sampling procedure was employed because a secondary objective of the study is to 
analyse how different income groups react to changes in price.  The survey achieved an 
effective response rate of 32%, with 448 useable responses received.1  Summary statistics for 
the independent variables used in the model are reported in Table 1.  The survey collected 
four types of information as described below.2   
Current Waste Diversion Practises 
Households were asked about their current demand for kerbside collection (both bags 
and recycling bins), as well as their current use of private service and diversion options.  This 
information provides a benchmark for comparison with the results of unit pricing, and a 
check on the validity of the self-reported values.  At the time of the survey, each household 
                                                 
1 Of the 1500 surveys mailed out, 121 were returned unopened because the respondents had changed address 
from the one given on the electoral roll. 
2 A copy of the survey is available upon request. 
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was provided with 52 black bags each year.  The average number of bags currently used was 
reported in the survey as 53 per year, or slightly over two a fortnight. To achieve the CCC 
goal of an 80% reduction, the average needs to fall to approximately 11 bags per annum or 
0.4 per fortnight.  Around 90% of respondents reported that they recycle, a very similar 
figure to council estimates of an 85% participation rate (CCC, 2005). The majority recycle 
every week, but a significant minority (around 25%) recycle only every second week.  The 
average is 1.5 bins per fortnight, while the mode is 2.  Approximately half of the households 
compost.  This figure is very similar to council estimates that 55% of households compost to 
some extent (CCC, 2005).  Very few households indicated that they dispose of waste in other 
ways such as burning (2%) and illegal dumping (1%). Around 8% of households use a 
private waste service as a substitute for council kerbside collection.  Another 18% use both 
council and private services.  These figures are slightly higher than those reported by the 
council, which estimates 18% of households use a private service (CCC, 2005).  The average 
size of the subscription is 27 litres per week, although the range is large.3 
Hypothetical Unit Pricing Scenarios 
Respondents were asked to indicate the quantity of bags that they would put out each 
fortnight for different prices per bag under a hypothetical unit-pricing system.  Subjects were 
asked to imagine that rates would be reduced accordingly.  The elicitation method can best be 
described as iterative bidding.  A sample question is shown in Figure 2.  Although collection 
is weekly, a fortnight was used to aid respondents to perceive use below one bag per week. 
To assist respondents to make meaningful decisions and ease their task, tables were provided 
that contained the cost of the service to the household per fortnight and per year, under 
different levels of service (i.e. the number of bags put out for collection).   
                                                 
3 Additional analysis of the private service figures is provided in the discussion section. 
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Each respondent was asked about three different unit prices, with respondents 
randomly allocated to one of two price treatments: either $0.50, $2.00, and $3.00, or $1.00, 
$2.50 and $4.00.  Survey pre-testing, using the cognitive interview method (Dillman, 1998), 
indicated what respondents might consider to be a realistic range of bag prices. Households 
indicating a reduction in bags were then asked an open-ended question about how they 
intended to achieve that reduction. 
The legitimacy of these responses depends on the avoidance of common CVM biases 
(Carson and Mitchell, 1989).  Because respondents are already familiar with the subject of 
the survey (i.e. black bags), hypothetical bias is unlikely to be a problem.  In addition, all of 
those who reduced gave some idea of how they would achieve the reduction.  Given local 
opposition to reducing the number of bags, strategic bias might be more of a problem.  This 
could be evidenced by respondents showing no response, which approximately 45% of the 
sample did.  However there are significant differences between the groups that reduced and 
did not reduce, which might legitimately account for lack of response.  In particular, those 
not reducing already use a significantly lower number of bags on average, which may 
indicate that these households are conscientious about minimising waste generation, and are 
not able to lower further, while those in the higher average group are not so conscientious.  
Alternatively, because non-reducers use relatively high levels of private service then they will 
not react to a price increase for the council service. 
Environmental Attitudes 
The third component of the survey sought to identify attitudinal motivations for 
household waste minimisation.  Respondents were asked what motivated their household to 
minimize waste.  They were presented with six possible motivations and asked to indicate the 
importance of each using a Likert scale, ranging from one (strongly agree) to five (strongly 
disagree).  The responses were coded into a dummy variable taking on a value one if the 
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respondent either ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ with the statement, and zero otherwise.    The 
mean values of these dummy variables are reported in Table 1.  The most important 
motivator was ‘concern for the natural environment,’ with around 85% of respondents 
indicating it was an important motivating factor. 
Waste Generation 
The fourth component of the survey collected socio-economic variables such as the 
number of adults and children in the household, household income, and education.  These 
household characteristics may contribute to the amount of waste generated by the household.  
Participants were also asked if they “consider the cost of disposing of a product at the end of 
its lifetime or disposing of its packaging” when making a purchase decision.  Only 18% of 
survey respondents indicated that they practised source reduction of this kind.   
A chi-squared test was used to test the null hypothesis that there is no association 
between the distribution of the sample and 2001 census data.  The null was rejected at better 
than 95% significance level for all demographic variables (income, size of household, gender, 
labour force status, education, ethnicity), except for age.  The distribution of age is skewed 
upwards because respondents were taken from the electoral roll, which naturally omits those 
17 and under, however these individuals would seldom be responsible for decisions on 
household waste management.  These results confirm both the representativeness of the 
sample and the success of stratified sampling by income.  This together with the 32% 
response rate and the similarity of the figures to council ones serves to further strengthen the 
validity of the study.  
The limitations of this research stem from the inability to form a quantitative estimate 
of respondent’s use of diversion options such as recycling post-implementation of a unit-
pricing programme. This research is able to present only a qualitative measure.  Some 
limitations also stem from the data collection process. The number of bags put out provides 
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the measure of the level of waste disposed of via council service. However the volume and 
weight of a council rubbish bag varies across households, but is treated as constant, that is, 
one bag. 
 
4. Model Specification 
To evaluate the effectiveness of unit pricing, the following demand function is 
estimated:  
Q = f (waste diversion practises, unit price, environmental attitudes, waste generation) 
where Q = the number of CCC black bags put out every fortnight, and the independent 
variables are detailed in Table 1. 
 Two econometric issues need to be accounted for.  First, because the dependent 
variable takes on predominately integer values the count data model is the appropriate one to 
use.  Second, the decision about number of bags and recycling participation is made jointly 
by households.  In order to control for the simultaneous nature of these decisions, 
instrumental variables is used. 
Poisson Count Data Model 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the dependent variable, the number of bags that a 
household puts out each fortnight over all values of the price per bag given.  The majority (97 
percent) of the values reported by households are integers.  The appropriate econometric 
model to use in this circumstance is the Poisson count data model (Cameron and Trivedi, 
(1998)).  To apply the count data model, non-integer values were rounded down to the 
nearest whole number.  This adjustment had no impact on the mean or standard deviation of 
the dependent variable. 
The Poisson parameterisation exploits the discrete characteristic of the dependent 
variable. For a discrete random variable, yi, with observed frequencies, yi, i = 1,..., N, 
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where 0iy , the Poisson regression model specifies that iy  given ix  is Poisson distributed 
with density 
 
i
y
i
ii y
exyf
ii  , 3... 2, ,1iy      
The distribution is determined by the single parameter  , the mean.  This parameter is given 
by the conditional mean function 
   ixiii ex yE       
which is determined by the regression equation.  This study specifies an exponential 
conditional mean function, as is common practice.  This mimics the nonnegative nature of the 
dependent variable, ensuring that none of the fitted values of the model will be negative.  
For empirical estimation one of the most important restrictions of the Poisson 
assumption is the equality of the (conditional) mean and variance.  The raw data shown in 
Figure 3 suggest that there is under-dispersion present, that is, the variance is less than the 
mean.4  In settings of under-dispersion an alternative is to use Poisson quasi-maximum 
likelihood (PQML), involving use of Huber-White robust standard errors (Huber (1967) and 
White (1982)).  Provided the conditional mean function is correctly specified and the 
conditional distribution of y is Poisson, the PQML ˆ  is consistent, efficient, and 
asymptotically normally distributed. 
The non-linear nature of the model complicates interpretation of the results.  The 
estimated coefficients () only indicate the direction and significance.  The impact of a unit 
change in a regressor on the expected value of the dependent variable is found by calculating 
the marginal effect, where the marginal effect of the jth regressor is given by: 
                                                 
4 This restriction, referred to as equi-dispersion, is formally tested using a regression based test proposed by 
Cameron and Trivedi (1990). The test is based on an auxiliary regression of   ioi ye 2 on  2ˆ iy  where the errors 
and fitted values are obtained from an initial estimation of the Poisson model. The test statistic is highly 
significant leading to rejection of the equi-dispersion assumption. 
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The value of the marginal effect depends on the value of the explanatory variables for which 
it is computed.  It is common to evaluate these at the mean values of the regressors. 
Instrumental Variable Estimation for Recycling 
To control for the simultaneity between bags and recycling bins, an instrumental variables 
regression is used for recycling, and then the fitted values for recycling are used in the bags 
equation.  The recycling equation is estimated with the best regressors: number of adults, 
number of children and household income.  Because the recycling variable is also integer and 
suffers from under-dispersion the PQML is appropriate here also.  As with number of bags all 
non-integer values are rounded down, but this does not change the mean and variance 
significantly.  These results are summarized in Table 2.5  The variables collectively and 
individually are highly significant. The fitted values for the dependent variable from this 
model are used as the instrument in the original equation. 
 
5. Results 
Table 3 reports the results for the estimation of the demand function for CCC bags.  
Overall the model fits well, with the chi-squared test indicating that the explanatory variables 
as a whole are significant in explaining the dependent variable.  The value of RsqD, the sum 
of the squared deviance residuals, considered by Cameron and Trivedi (1998) to be the most 
appropriate measure of fit for this model, could be considered low, however cross-sectional 
data often suffer from this result. 
While not all the individual variables are individually significant, those that are have 
the correct sign.  Particularly important, the unit price charged has a significant negative 
impact on the demand for bags.  Greater use of waste diversion options (recycling, private 
                                                 
5 All empirical model estimation is carried out using LIMDEP econometric software. 
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service, and composting) also significantly reduces demand for bags.  Looking specifically at 
the marginal effects, each litre of private service that the household uses decreases the 
expected number of bags by 0.0085 bags. Each bin of recycling put out by the household 
reduces the expected number of bags by 2.8 per fortnight. 
  If the household uses composting to dispose of food waste then the expected number 
of bags put out per fortnight falls by 0.83 bags.  If the household purchases products with 
relatively less packaging or otherwise relatively low disposal costs, behaviour referred to as 
source reduction, then this reduces the expected number of bags by 0.78 bags per fortnight. 
None of the attitudinal variables are individually statistically significant although 
concern for the natural environment, other peoples views of oneself, and price of waste 
service all have the envisaged signs.  
For the average household, each additional adult results in an additional bag every 
fortnight, while each child contributes approximately half as much waste as each adult, with 
each extra child resulting in half a bag extra per fortnight.  The marginal effect of household 
income on the number of bags put out as presented in Table 3 is estimated as 0.09. As the 
income variable is measured in census categories, the coefficient estimate is interpreted as an 
increase in income from one category to the next, calculated at the average value. 
In the next three subsections more detailed discussion is included on three particular 
issues of interest: the potential for unit pricing to achieve waste reductions, diversion options, 
and equity considerations. 
5.1 Unit Pricing 
The marginal effect of price in Table 3 is -0.21. This is calculated at the average of all 
prices (all other variables are at their averages also), which is $1.64. This is interpreted as a 
one unit increase in price (i.e. $1.00), from the average price, leading to a decrease in the 
expected number of bags by 0.21 bags per fortnight. To investigate how the marginal effect 
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of price changes across price levels, we can change the value at which the marginal effect of 
price is computed, all other variables remain at their mean values.  These effects are 
summarised in Table 4.  We can see that the magnitude of the marginal effect of price is 
decreasing as price increases. This illustrates how important it is to factor in the status quo 
policy when considering any change.  Households respond more strongly to initial increases 
in price than they do to increases once the price is set.  
To calculate the effect of increasing price from $0.00 to a price greater than a one unit 
increase (i.e. $1.00), we need to compute an accumulative or total effect. For example, 
consider an increase from $0.00 to $3.00 per bag.  Using the conditional means provided in 
Table 4 the cumulative effect is a decrease in the expected number of bags of 0.61 per 
fortnight. 
Even though the absolute magnitudes are small, cumulatively quite large impacts 
occur when they are multiplied over the entire city.  For example, if a unit-price of $1.00 per 
bag was introduced the model predicts a reduction of 0.23 bags for the average household per 
fortnight compared with the status-quo of $0. In Christchurch with approximately 123,000 
households this equates to a reduction of 735,540 bags per year going to the landfill.  
However, even a price of $4.00 per bag would only reduce the number of bags by 40%, 
halfway to meeting the council’s target. 
5.2 Reduction Achievement  
How households achieve any reduction is crucial to the success of the waste 
management program.  Respondents who indicated reductions under unit-pricing were asked 
an open-ended question about how they would achieve any reduction in the number of bags 
put out.  The responses are categorised in Table 5, where the percentages given are of the 
number of households actually reducing the number of bags put out, where n = 247.   The 
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sum of the percentages is more than 100 because some households indicated several options. 
All households that would reduce number of bags indicated at least one option. 
Subscription to a private service is the most popular option, with almost 25 percent of 
households choosing this option to help obtain reductions in the number of council bags used. 
This is perhaps the most serious threat to achieving waste targets in a unit-pricing programme 
as it results in no reduction in the amount of waste going to the landfill. 
Composting, compaction, and recycling are also major reduction options for 
households.  Compaction reduces the volume but not the mass of waste, and so does not 
contribute to a waste reduction goal. Some households considered that they would decrease 
the number of bags that their household put out but did not know how they would achieve 
this. This group is measured by ‘can not do any more’. This group of households may be 
doing all they can to minimise waste.  
Respondents who indicate that they are willing to dump waste illegally may pose a 
problem. Almost 5% of those households reducing the number of bags put out in response to 
the introduction of unit-pricing state they will dispose of waste illegally, for example 
dumping on the roadside, to help achieve that reduction. This might be considered an emotive 
reaction. When the costs of actually doing it are realised, this may not be cost minimising 
behaviour.  Miranda and Bynum (2002) report that while illegal dumping may increase 
initially this reduces when long-run adjustments occur.  The option to substitute towards 
private service could also be overstated.  As opposed to other diversion options, households 
face a significant positive marginal cost for private service. Households who currently use 
only the council provided service, (74% of the sample) may react differently when they look 
to substitute towards private service as alternatives with lower relative cost, such as recycling 
and source reduction behaviour will be more attractive.   
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As part of question three of the survey, respondents currently using private service 
were asked to state the cost of the service as well as billing and collection periods. This data 
was used to calculate a cost per litre of service.6  Eleven percent of private service users are 
achieving costs per litre of $0.02 or less. At this rate an equivalent cost for the fifty litre 
council bag would be $1.00.  However the average per litre cost is $0.05, indicating an 
equivalent cost per council bag of $2.50.   
In addition, some households used private service exclusively even though they were 
aware that they had already paid (in their rates) to use the council service. This highlights that 
there are characteristics of the private service that attract consumers other than the price. The 
convenience of having a waste receptacle that does not rip easily, either accidentally or by 
animals; is easy to put at kerbside because it has wheels; is weather proof; can store waste 
easily; and is monitored by service people; is demanded by many households. 
While unit pricing may achieve reductions in black bag waste, if households shift to 
private service then there will be no reduction in the total amount of waste being landfilled.  
The CCC may need to consider other positive incentives in addition to unit pricing.  One 
possibility is a council provided composting services, a trial of which is currently under way.  
5.3 Do different income groups react differently to changes in price? 
Income distribution concerns can be investigated as part of an effort to recognise 
social sustainability as a requirement for domestic waste management policy.  We might 
expect the marginal effect of price to be greater for lower income groups who face a 
relatively tighter budget constraint.  Analysing this effect could highlight which income 
groups might reduce their demand more than others.  The expected number of bags 
demanded at varying price levels is computed for three different household income groups.  
                                                 
6 Households fill their containers to 94 percent on average. 
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The results are shown in Figure 4, where the slope gives the marginal effect of price 
changes.7 
As Figure 4 shows, the price effect is greatest when moving from a price of zero to 
$1.00, and that the effect of price is diminishing as the price per bag increases. This is the 
same for all income groups. A more interesting observation is the higher income groups react 
more strongly to the price, and the price effect is converging between income groups as price 
increases.  The marginal effect at price equal to zero is -0.22, -0.27 and -0.33 for the low 
income, medium and high income groups respectively.  This gives a range of 0.11. When the 
marginal effect is evaluated at a price of $4.00 then the effects are -0.13, -0.16 and -0.20, 
giving a range of 0.07.  This suggests that as an autonomous level is reached the ability of a 
household to reduce waste further is limited.  Figure 4 also reminds us that, holding all else 
constant, higher income groups have a higher conditional mean relative to low income 
households. That is, holding all else constant, a wealthy household will produce more waste 
than a relatively low income household. At each price level the high income groups have a 
relatively greater opportunity to decrease the amount of bags used because the magnitude of 
their waste is greater. The lower income groups are closer to the autonomous level of waste 
generation and disposal. They do not generate or dispose of a lot to start with and therefore 
they do not have as much opportunity to decrease the use of bags.  This result is consistent 
with Fullerton & Kinnaman (1996) who found that those with higher incomes achieved 
greater reductions in weight of garbage following introduction of unit- pricing. 
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This paper demonstrates that the use of the CVM before the implementation of a unit 
pricing scheme can provide valuable information to communities.  The demand estimation 
                                                 
7 Marginal effects are calculated with all variables other than price and income set at their mean values. 
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shows that initial responses to unit pricing are the strongest, with reductions becoming 
progressively smaller for higher increases in prices.  In the Christchurch context, the results 
suggest that a price of at least $8 would be needed to achieve the CCC goal of 80% reduction.  
This price is likely to be an understatement, because a price so high is likely to cause even 
more local opposition and use of diversion options (especially illegal disposal) than that 
reported in the survey where the highest price scenario was $4 per bag. 
While unit pricing may lower the number of black bags collected at the kerbside, this 
does not necessarily translate into a lower weight of waste being sent to the landfill.  The 
main diversion options used are substitution towards private service and compaction.  With 
compaction, while the number of bags may lessen, the weight will not.  Private service 
provides attributes to consumers that the council provided service does not, so that some 
households use the private service even though it costs more than the council service.  If 
households simply substitute towards private service then no reduction waste will be 
achieved.  Use of private service seems more attractive as the unit price increases. 
In summary, the introduction of unit pricing in isolation seems unlikely to achieve the 
goal of reduced waste.  To avoid mass substitution to private service, the council service may 
need to change to being bin or can based, providing some of the non-price attributes that 
household’s value.  Additional positive incentives are also required, such as kerbside 
collection of organic waste, currently being trialled by the CCC. 
This study has focused on the application of a market-based instrument at the 
household level.  Instruments applied at the industry level, aimed at producers, also play an 
important role in minimizing waste generation (Choe and Fraser, 1999).  Research into the 
interaction of instruments at this, and the household level in New Zealand, is an essential part 
of the waste minimization debate.  Analysis of the incentive structures surrounding source 
reduction must also form an important part of further research in waste management. 
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Figure 1:  Per person domestic waste, recycling and green waste 
         Source: C.C.C. (2005)  
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Figure 2: WTP elicitation  
 
If rubbish bags were to cost $2.00 each, how much would your households rubbish collection 
cost?  (get figures from table below) 
$2.00 per bag 1 bag per fortnight 
2 bags per 
fortnight 
3 bags per 
fortnight 
4 bags per 
fortnight 
6 bags per 
fortnight 
Cost per 
fortnight $2.00 $4.00 $6.00 $8.00 $12.00 
Cost per year 
 $52.00 $104.00 $156.00 $208.00 $312.00 
 
Would this cost mean that your household would change the number of bags put out? 
If yes, then how many bags would be put out per fortnight?    
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Figure 3: Distribution of CCC Black Bags 
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Figure 4: Marginal Price Effect Across Income Groups 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Independent Variables 
Variable Mean 
Value 
Standard 
Deviation 
Current Waste Diversion Practises   
Recycling bins (per fortnight) 1.54 0.78 
Private service subscriptions (litres per week) 27.08 54.45 
Indicator variable for composting 0.50 0.50 
Indicator variable for burning 0.02 0.12 
Indicator variable for illegal disposal 0.01 0.09 
   
Unit Pricing   
Price per bag 1.64 1.40 
   
Environmental Attitudes   
Indicator variable for motivated by ‘concern for natural environment’ 0.85 0.35 
Indicator variable for motivated by ‘other peoples views of oneself’ 0.13 0.34 
Indicator variable for motivated by ‘price of waste service’ 0.55 0.50 
Indicator variable for motivated by ‘time and effort managing waste’ 0.42 0.49 
Indicator variable for motivated by ‘negative attributes of waste’  0.60 0.49 
Indicator variable for motivated by ‘desire for efficiency’ 0.70 0.46 
Indicator variable for member of environmental organisation 0.07 0.26 
   
Waste Generation Influences   
Number of adults (aged 16 and over) 2.11 0.73 
Number of children (aged less than 16) 0.54 0.92 
Household income census category 5.80 2.03 
Indicator variable for source reduction 0.18 0.39 
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Table 2: Instrumental variable estimation for recycling              
  Variable Marginal 
Effectsa 
Standard 
Errorb 
Adults 0.24** 0.04 
Children 0.10** 0.03 
Income 0.03* 0.01 
   
RsqD  0.10  
Chi-squared 68.00**  
 
* significant at 95% level of confidence 
** significant at 99% level of confidence 
a = computed at mean values of the independent variables. 
b = Huber-White robust standard errors 
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Table 3: Model Estimation for Number of Bags. 
  Variable Marginal Effectsa Standard Errorb 
Constant 3.09** 1.040 
Current Waste Diversion Practises   
Recycling (fitted values) -2.79* 1.205 
Private service -0.01** 0.001 
Compostingc -0.83** 0.070 
Burningc -0.81 0.273 
Illegalc -1.38 0.400 
Unit Pricing   
Price -0.21** 0.030 
Environmental Attitudesc   
Concern -0.90 0.104 
Other peoples -0.93 0.105 
Price of waste service -0.97 0.070 
Time and effort 1.05 0.076 
Negative attributes of waste 1.08 0.078 
Desire for efficiency 1.01 0.082 
Member 1.00 0.000 
Waste Generation Influences   
Adult 0.99** 0.327 
Children 0.50** 0.132 
Income 0.09** 0.032 
Source reductionc -0.78** 0.089 
   
RsqD 0.20  
Chi squared statistic        329.59**  
 
* significant at 95% level of confidence 
** significant at 99% level of confidence 
a = computed at mean values of all the independent variables. 
b = Huber-White robust standard errors 
c = Values given for indicator variables are actual marginal effects 
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Table 4 Marginal price effects 
 
Price Conditional mean (bags) Marginal effect of price 
$0.00 1.96 -0.25 
$1.00 1.73 -0.22 
$2.00 1.53 -0.19 
$3.00 1.35 -0.17 
$4.00 1.19 -0.15 
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Table 5 Waste Reduction Options (n = 247) 
 
Variable description    Percentage 
 
Private         24.3 
Compost      19.8    
Compaction        19.4 
Recycle        18.2 
Burn        12.1 
Source reduction      10.1 
Can not do any more        5.7 
Illegal          4.9 
Insinkerator        2.0 
 
 
